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We present a simplified BB84 protocol with only three quantum states and one decoy-state level.
We implement this scheme using the polarization degree of freedom at telecom wavelength. Only
one pulsed laser is used in order to reduce possible side-channel attacks. The repetition rate of
625 MHz and the achieved secret bit rate of 23 bps over 200 km of standard fiber are the actual state
of the art.
Secure communication is a central pillar of today’s so-
ciety, playing a key role not only in finance, defence and
industry, but also in the protection of the privacy of in-
dividuals. Most cryptographic systems used at present,
however, are lacking an information theoretical security
proof and are threatened by future quantum computers.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a way to over-
come this security issue by exchanging a secret key over
an insecure optical link. This key can be used in the
One-Time-Pad for secure communication [1].
The idea of QKD was born in 1984 when Bennett
and Brassard proposed a protocol which is now known
as BB84 [2]. Nowadays, a variety of different proto-
cols exists and many implementation using different de-
grees of freedom (DoF) of photons (polarization, phase,
etc.) have been demonstrated using optical fibers or free-
space [3–8].
For practical reasons, implementations of polarization-
based BB84 often use weak pulses from several different
laser diodes, one for each qubit state [9–12]. However, dif-
ferent lasers may have slightly different properties such
as frequency and emission time, offering to an eavesdrop-
per Eve the possibility of a so-called side-channel attack.
Eve, by looking at those properties, may determine the
qubit states sent without disturbing them [13, 14].
In this paper, we present a complete polarization-based
QKD setup based on a single laser in order to prevent
side-channel attacks exploiting the distinguishability of
different lasers. The source works at a repetition rate
of 625 MHz. We reduce the complexity of the scheme
as much as possible, using a three-state protocol [15],
only one decoy-state level [16, 17] and only two single-
photon detectors. We perform a complete key exchange,
with real-time error correction and privacy amplification
based on finite-key analysis.
In the following, we describe the protocol step by step.
1. State preparation: Alice uses a laser source emit-
ting phase-randomized weak coherent pulses and encodes
the states in the polarization DoF of the photons. She
chooses randomly one of the two bases X or Z with the as-
sociated probabilities pAX and p
A
Z = 1 − pAX , respectively.
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In the basis Z, she generates with uniform probability
the state |H〉 or |V 〉. In the basis X, she just prepares
|+〉 = (|H〉 + |V 〉)/√2. The pulse energy is chosen at
random among one of the two mean photon numbers µ1
and µ2 with the constraint µ1 > µ2 > 0, and probabili-
ties pµ1 and pµ2 = 1− pµ1 , respectively. µ1 is denoted as
signal level while µ2 is the decoy level. Alice sends the
qubits through an optical fiber to Bob.
2. Measurement: Bob performs a measurement on the
incoming signal at random in one of the two bases X or
Z with respective probabilities pBX and p
B
Z = 1− pBX . For
each detection, the basis and the measurement result are
recorded.
3. Basis reconciliation: Alice and Bob announce their
basis settings for the events where a detection has oc-
curred. The events from the Z basis are used to generate
the raw key, while those from the X basis are used to
estimate the eavesdropper potential information. After
having collected nECZ new raw key bits, they continue
with step 4.
4. Error correction: Alice and Bob apply an error cor-
rection algorithm on the block of nECZ bits during which
λEC = fEC ·nECZ ·h(QZ) bits are disclosed where fEC is the
efficiency of reconciliation, h(x) the binary entropy, and
QZ the error rate. In our protocol, we employed the error
correction algorithm Cascade which has a reconciliation
efficiency around 1.06 [18]. The procedure succeeds with
a probability 1−corr. After k = nZ/nECZ error correction
blocks they proceed to step 5.
5. Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob apply the
privacy amplification procedure on a block of size nZ to
obtain a secret key of l bits [19]. l is upper bounded by:
l ≤sZ,0 + sZ,1(1− h(φZ))− λtEC
− 4 log2(7/sec)− log2(1/cor), (1)
where sZ,0 and sZ,1 are the lower bound on the number of
vacuum and single-photon detection in the Z basis, φZ is
the upper bound on the phase error rate, λtEC is the total
number of bits revealed during the error correction, and
sec and cor are the secrecy and correctness parameters,
respectively.
Having only two intensity levels does not allow us to
directly measure an upper bound on sZ,0, which is nec-
essary to estimate the lower bound on the single-photon
events. To solve this issue, we consider that the total
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FIG. 1. Schematics of the experimental setup. IM: intensity modulator; PC: polarization controller; PM: phase modulator
based on a lithium niobate waveguide; HiBi: high birefringence fiber; VA: variable attenuator; PBS: polarizing beamsplitter;
BS: beamsplitter; EPC: electronic polarization controller; SDP: single-photon detector. The arm connecting the BS and the
PC2 introduces a delay of 800 ps compared to the arm from the BS to the PC1 due to a difference in length. The blue lines
connecting the PBS are polarization-maintaining fiber and have all the same length. Dashed lines denote temperature stabilized
boxes.
number of errors on each basis is only due to the vacuum
component. This is the most conservative way to esti-
mate the upper bound of sZ,0 (for more details, see [20]).
Now, we describe the experimental setup that is shown
in Figure 1. The experiment is controlled by two field
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) placed on Alice’s
and Bob’s side. On Alice’s side, a gain-switched DFB
laser at 1554.94 nm [Anritsu], triggered at 625 MHz, gen-
erates phase-randomized weak coherent pulses with a
pulse duration of 93 ps. An intensity modulator [Phot-
line] based on an integrated Mach-Zehnder interferom-
eter on lithium-niobate (LiNbO3) then encodes the de-
coy levels. The polarization encoding is done by a tita-
nium indiffused LiNbO3 phase modulator (PM) [Thor-
labs]. The pulses are injected in it with a polarization
(|H〉+ |V 〉)/√2. We control the relative phase φ between
|H〉 and |V 〉 by applying a voltage on the PM to change
its birefringence. At the output we have then the state
(|H〉 + eiφ |V 〉)/√2. The phase φ ∈ {0, pi/2, pi} is ran-
domly chosen by the FPGA and set by a 3-level digital-
to-analog converter made in-house. The PM introduces
a polarization mode delay of 10.7 ps that is compensated
by 8 m of high birefringence (HiBi) fiber. Alice chooses
the basis X with a probability pAX =
1
8 . At the output of
Alice’s device, an attenuator sets the correct mean pho-
ton number of the outgoing pulses.
Bob’s basis choice is made by a symmetric beamsplit-
ter (BS), meaning that pBZ = p
B
X =
1
2 . The splitting ratio
could be optimized for each distance. However, for short
distances pBZ >
1
2 is not advantageous since the detec-
tors are saturated, and for longer distances pBX has to be
increased to have enough statistics in the X basis. So
for simplicity we chose a 50:50 splitting ratio as a good
compromise for almost all distances. Two polarization
controllers, PC1 and PC2, are set such that the two fiber-
based polarizing beamsplitters, PBS1 and PBS2 (extinc-
tion ratios > 20 dB), perform a projection in the Z (rec-
tilinear) and X (diagonal) basis, respectively. The out-
put ports corresponding to |H〉 and |V 〉 are recombined
with |+〉 and |−〉 via two other PBSs. To distinguish
between the two bases, an additional delay of 800 ps is
introduced in the arm of the X basis. With this tem-
poral multiplexing we are able to use only two detectors
instead of four. We employ in-house made free-running
single-photon detectors based on InGaAs/InP negative
feedback avalanche photodiodes cooled by a free-piston
Stirling cooler to achieve dark counts rates of 10 Hz [21].
Note that for shorter distances up to 100 km it would
be more appropriate to use four detectors in order to re-
duce the saturation. Moreover, Peltier cooling would be
sufficient, as dark counts are less critical.
The polarization of the pulses during transmission is
prone to fluctuations, e.g. due to temperature drifts.
To compensate for these fluctuations, we have imple-
mented a feedback loop based on trial-and-error approach
that acts on an electronic polarization controller (EPC)
[Phoenix Photonics] placed at the input of Bob’s setup.
This EPC is composed of three adjustable phase plates
based on small HiBi fiber pieces whose temperature is
adjusted to change their birefringence. The third one
is set such that it affects only the phase between |H〉
and |V 〉, and by consequence the quantum bit error rate
(QBER) in the X basis. Thus, the feedback loop takes
the QBER in the Z basis as error signal to control the
first two wave-plates and in the X basis for the third one.
Note that, the QBER in the X basis is directly given by
the probability to detect the state |−〉 when the basis X
is prepared. In the Z basis, the QBER QZ is provided in
real-time by the Cascade error correction algorithm. This
approach exempts us to use additional lasers to monitor
the polarization drifts [22].
We perform exchanges of secret keys with complete
distillation, i.e. taking into account the finite statistics
effect for the privacy amplification, for different trans-
mission distances. The quantum channel is composed of
a fiber spool of 12 km and a variable attenuator set to a
value ηatt to simulate additional optical fiber with a loss
of 0.2 dB/km. In order to test the polarization stabiliza-
tion scheme, we also perform a key exchange with more
than 100 km of real fiber. For all measurements, the sizes
of the error correction blocks and the privacy amplifica-
tion blocks are set to nECZ = 8192 and nZ = 8.192× 106,
respectively. These parameters offer a good compromise
between the time of acquisition and the effect of finite-
key statistics on the secret key rate (SKR). The security
parameters are fixed to sec = 10
−9 and corr = 10−15.
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FIG. 2. SKR (a) and QBER (b) as a function of the transmis-
sion distance. The measurements were done using a quantum
channel composed of 12.16 km of real fiber and attenuation
to simulate additional distance. The red square indicates a
measurement done with more than 100 km of real fiber.
For every result depicted in Figure 2, the SKR has been
maximized by optimizing the mean photon numbers µ1,
and µ2, the probability pµ1 and the detectors parameters
i.e. temperature, dead-time and efficiency. The QBER
due to polarization misalignment is automatically mini-
mized via the feedback that acts on the EPC.
From Figure 2, we can clearly identify three regimes.
Up to 125 km, the SKR is mainly limited by the satu-
ration of the detectors due to a dead-time around 30µs.
Therefore it is favourable to keep the mean photon num-
ber of the states sent by Alice low. At 25 km we use µ1 =
0.10, µ2 = 0.06 and pµ1 = 0.56. In this range the SKR
could be improved by employing faster single-photon de-
tectors such as superconducting nanowire single-photon
detectors [23] or gated avalanche photodiodes [24]. Nev-
ertheless, the InGaAs single-photon detectors we use are
much less complex. Above 125 km, the SKR decreases
exponentially as expected due to the fiber loss, until
around 175 km where the dark-count rate becomes sig-
nificant compared to the detection rate and as a conse-
quence the QBER increases rapidly. At this distance,
the settings are µ1 = 0.33, µ2 = 0.14 and pµ1 = 0.75.
We achieve a SKR of 303 bps. This result is comparable
to other state of the art of long-distance QKD experi-
ments [23, 25–27]. Moreover, the SKRs are better than
other two-decoy/four-state BB84 experiments [11, 28].
Indeed, our simulations show that up to about 175 km,
the one-decoy level approach is slightly more efficient
than the two-decoy one. Finally, the SKR at 200 km is
23 bps.
To conclude, we implemented a BB84 protocol with
states encoded in the polarization DoF of weak coherent
pulses. Our source is based on only one pulsed laser in
order to prevent side-channel attacks. It could be used
both for fiber and free space implementations. We kept
the system simple with a three-state encoding approach
with only one decoy-state level. Therefore we have in to-
tal 6 different states instead of 12 for the complete pro-
tocol, which greatly simplifies the state preparation and
the data processing. Using a rigorous security analysis
taking into account finite-key effects, we distilled secret
keys at a rate of 23 bps for a distance of 200 km.
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